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Abstract
Farming activity is modeled under an intervention policy regime, combining
the environmental requirements of the Council Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)
and the compensatory provisions of the second pillar of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy. The optimizing behavioural rule along with the evolutionary rule
is employed in order to model the individual farmer￿ s decision making, regard-
ing compliance or not with regulatory provisions. The impact of these di⁄erent
behavioral rules on the selection of monitoring e⁄ort and thus on the compli-
ance incentives of a population of farmers is examined. Analysis indicated that
if monitoring e⁄ort is chosen arbitrarily or optimally based on the accustomed
full rationality assumption then the population adopts a monomorphic behav-
ior in the long-run, involving either full or noncompliance with the Directive￿ s
provisions. A polymorphic behavior involving partial compliance of the pop-
ulation also arises if the dynamic model of optimal monitoring is constrained
by replicator dynamics which represent the imitation rules. It is evident, thus,
that the number and the type of the equilibrium steady-states is a⁄ected by
the assumption regarding the behavioral rule adopted by regulated agents. Fi-
nally, the dynamics of the population of compliant farmers is also assessed under
accumulation of monitoring capital indicating identical properties.
Keywords: Nitrates Directive, agri-environmental programs, monitoring ef-
fort, monitoring capital, rationality, optimal behavioral rule, replicator dynam-
ics, imitation.
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11 Introduction
Excessive nitrogen (N) surpluses from mineral fertilizers and animal manure,
appear to be a major pollutant in many European underground and surface wa-
tersheds,2 posing a threat to the environment and the human health.3 To provide
a general level of protection for all waters against nitrate pollution, the Euro-
pean Council established in 1991 the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC), de￿ning
a series of codes of good agricultural practice (EC, 1991).4 The non-point-source
characteristics,5 however, of agricultural pollution pose a substantial problem
in the e⁄ective regulation of reported water pollution problems. The inability
of regulatory authorities to directly observe individual decisions (i.e. nitrogen
usage) provides the farmers incentives to deviate from statutory requirements
and retain nitrogen usage at the unregulated pro￿t maximizing levels, with the
associated adverse consequences. To ensure that regulated farmers comply with
statutory nitrogen performance standards and that foreseen sanctions are im-
posed on those deviating so that compliance is further enforced, Member States
are required to incorporate a substantial monitoring mechanism in their pol-
icy design.6 It is evident thus, that the e⁄ectiveness of the existing regulatory
policies to induce restricted usage of nitrogen input is heavily dependent on
the ability of the monitoring and enforcement mechanism to provide adequate
compliance incentives, and thus implement the Nitrates Directive.
The purpose of the present paper is to examine the e⁄ectiveness of a moni-
toring and enforcement mechanism to induce in the long-run a large population
of homogeneous farmers to comply with the statutory requirements of a regula-
tory regime under di⁄erent assumption regarding the way that farmers choose
to comply or not with regulation. The examined regulatory regime falls into the
2Excessive concentrations of nutrients result in the eutrophication of slow ￿owing rivers,
lakes, reservoirs and coastal areas, appearing through the proliferation of algal bloom (Huhtala
and Laukkanen, 2004; Isik, 2004; Owen et al., 1998; Pau Vall and Vidal, 2006). There is
evidence that at least 30-40% of rivers and lakes show eutrophication symptoms or bring high
N ￿uxes to coastal waters and seas. The agricultural origin of such ￿uxes accounts for 50 to
80% of total N inputs to EU waters (EC, 2002).
3N exposure is responsible for the blue-baby syndrome (methemoglobinemia) in infants
and gastric cancer in adults (Fleming and Adams, 1997; Abler and Shortle, 1995; Johnson et
al., 1991).
4These codes concern mostly issues of land application. They are mandatorily implemented
through action programs either through out the territory of Member States or at speci￿c zones
vulnerable to nitrates pollution (i.e. NVZs). For further details see Axes II and III (EC, 1991).
5A pollution problem is called as NPS problem if there is uncertainty on the regulator￿ s
behalf about the location of the decision makers (polluters) and the degree of each agent￿ s
responsibility in the aggregate pollution. In short the origins of this uncertainty can either
be attributed to stochastic in￿uences a⁄ecting fate and transport of pollutants, the great
number of sources of pollution emissions that can be either static (farms, households) or
mobile (vehicles), and/or the regulator￿ s inability to infer individual emissions from ambient
pollution levels or inputs used (Xepapadeas, 1995).
6For instance, an environment agency has the task of undertaking occasional random spot-
checks, visiting farms and inspecting the operation ￿eld as well as the ￿eld records (DEFRA,
2004). Guidelines for the monitoring referred to in Articles 5 and 6 may be drawn up in
accordance with the procedure laid out in Article 9 of the Nitrates Directive (EC, 1991).
2category of public voluntary environmental programs7 and involves a combina-
tion of "carrot" ￿nancial inducements provided through the agri-environmental
programs of the second pillar of the communal agricultural policy (CAP) and
"stick" legal binding features of the action programs8 of the European Council
Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC).9
In our approach, and in contrast to the majority of the enforcement liter-
ature, farmers do not necessarily adopt an optimizing behavioral rule in their
decision to comply or not with the suggested nitrogen usage constraint, but
may follow evolutionary rules modeled by imitation dynamics.10 Most eco-
nomic models assume that agents are "in￿nite in faculties", they act "as if"
unboundedly rational (Conlisk, 1996). If farmers are characterized by full ratio-
nality then they adopt optimizing behavioral rules and they behave as though
they had all the necessary information when they decide about complying or
not.11 In such a case farmers have full knowledge of the structure of payo⁄s and
after comparing the payo⁄ that each strategy entails they de￿ne their optimal
response to the regulation. This response is maintained across time and space if
there is no modi￿cation of the policy parameters by the regulator. On the other
hand, under bounded rationality agents "are no longer assumed to be mathemat-
ical prodigies with access to encyclopedic mannuals written by omniscient game
theorists" (Binmore, 1992).12 Farmers cannot choose their individual strategy
in an optimal manner, and their decision about whether to comply or not is
adapted to the information revealed via their interaction over time. We assume
that such passive decision making is based on the imitation of the better-o⁄
performing strategy and is modeled by the replicator dynamics, imitation rule.
Under such an evolutionary process more successful agents and activities gradu-
ally increase their share in the population at the expense of less successful agents
and activities (Conlisk, 1996), leading potential agents who have no clear idea
what is going on to behavior that may look very rational indeed to a Kibitzer
(Binmore, 1992).
Individual compliance incentives, along with the aggregate environmental
performance of a given population, are a⁄ected by the monitoring undertaken
given the homogeneity assumption. An environmental agency that engages into
7Public voluntary agreements are environmental programs entirely developed by a regu-
latory body. No bargaining is involved between regulated agents and the regulator in the
de￿nition of environmental goals and means of achieving them. Polluting agents can only
agree or not to adopt the terms of regulation a⁄ecting their activities. For further details see
Mazurek (1998), Lyon and Maxwell (2002) and ￿aeur et al. (2001).
8Examples of such action programs are the Nitrogen Management Program (Denmark),
Ferti-Mieux Initiative (France) and Prop￿ eau - Sable pilot project (Belgium) (EC, 2002).
9"Carrot" incentives involve total-cost or sharing subsidies, information subsidies, technical
assistance and /or public recognition (Mazurek, 1998), while "stick" measures involve the
implementation of existing mandatory restriction or the establishment of a new regulation.
10For such an exception to the traditional enforcement literature see Xepapadeas (2005).
11Rational economic choice involves optimization in the sense that agents consider all pos-
sible alternatives and choose the best (Conlisk, 1996).
12According to Conlisk (1996), though people are bounded rational, they learn optima
through practice and in the end act as if unboundendly rational. Economists just take a
shortcut and assume unbounded rationality from the start.
3costly and accurate monitoring is considered, where the number of random spot-
checks is de￿ned either in an arbitrary way, based on the alternative behavioral
compliance rules assumed to be adopted by farmers, or selected optimally by
minimizing a social welfare criterion, de￿ned as the sum of monitoring costs
and social environmental damages, constrained by the farmers￿full or bounded
rationality behavioral rules. Under each approach the selection criteria for moni-
toring e⁄ort stimulating long-term compliance of farmers are discussed, allowing
comparisons of equilibrium outcomes under di⁄erent rationality assumptions.
The contribution of this paper consists of the development of a dynamic
model of optimal monitoring constrained by an evolutionary imitation behav-
ioral rule. The steady-state equilibrium proportion of complying farmers of this
model, as well as the corresponding monitoring e⁄ort level is contrasted with
the equilibrium proportion resulting from a conventional optimal monitoring
model which considers that agents are fully rational. Indeed the main distinc-
tion between the two behavioral rules and the main ￿nding of this paper is that
under full rationality monomorphic outcomes13 are the equilibrium outcomes,
while under bounded rationality and imitation rules polymorphic outcomes14
are very likely as evolutionary stable equilibria. In particular, our analysis indi-
cates that if the monitoring e⁄ort level is chosen arbitrarily, that is not through
an optimal monitoring model, then the characteristics of the equilibrium out-
come are una⁄ected by the assumed behavioral rule regarding farmers￿decision
about choosing compliance decisions. In such a case the equilibrium outcome
is monomorphic, implying either full compliance, or noncompliance with the
Directive￿ s provisions. To guarantee full compliance the environmental agency
should precommit to a monitoring e⁄ort value that is higher than the critical
value for which farmers are indi⁄erent between compliance and deviation. The
number and the type of equilibrium steady-states determining farmers￿compli-
ance are a⁄ected if monitoring is chosen optimally. A monomorphic behavior
is the steady state outcome if the social welfare criterion is minimized condi-
tional to an optimizing behavioral rule by the farmers, while if the problem is
constrained by replicator dynamics representing the passive imitation rule, then
the population may adopt either a monomorphic or polymorphic behavior. In
the latter case whether the population converges in the long-run to the socially-
desired outcome of full compliance, or to an intermediate status characterized
by partial compliance, depends on the initial conditions of the problem given the
fact that both the monomorphic and polymorphic steady-states satisfy a saddle
point property. It is evident that the assumption regarding the farmers￿adopted
behavioral rule and the way that the environmental agent selects monitoring ef-
fort level, a⁄ects the long-term behavior of the population of farmers. Finally,
13The long-term equilibrium is monomorphic if the entire population of farmers follows the
same strategy and adopts a homogenous behaviour. This implies that either all the farmers
comply with the provisions of the Directive or that they all deviate from the action program
rules.
14A steady state is so-called polymorphic if a heterogeneous strategic behaviour is evolu-
tionary stable in the long-run. This implies that only a proportion of farmers comply with
the Directive, while the remaining proportion deviates.
4dynamics of the regulated population with regard to compliance with the given
regulation are reassessed under the presence of investment in monitoring capital.
2 Modelling Farm Activity under the Nitrates
Directive
Consider an agricultural area characterised as a nitrates vulnerable zone15 con-
sisting of i = 1;2;:::v small and identical farmers operating under competi-
tive conditions. Individual production choices fxij;nig positively a⁄ect crop
yields:16
yi = f(xij;ni)
where xij = (xi1;xi2;:::;xim) is the vector of agent i0s choices among a set
of j = 1;:::;m inputs and ni the employed nitrogen input, either organic or
manufactured.
Production is associated with unintended generation of nitrates leaching
(Ni) that contaminates underground and surface water resources.17 At time t








indicating by an appropriate choice of units a positive, one-to-one relation be-
tween individual nitrate leaching Ni (t) and employed nitrogen input ni (t).
In the absence of any regulatory intervention, farmer i employs the pro￿t
maximizing amount of nitrogen (no) and obtains the maximum payo⁄ de￿ned
as.18
￿o(no) : no = argmax
n ￿o(n) (2)
￿o(n) = max
x [pf(x;n) ￿ wx ￿ wnn] (3)
where w = (w1;:::;wm) is the vector of input prices, wn the nitrogen price and
p the output price in the competitive market.
In the unregulated case the generated nitrate emissions No exceed the socially-
desired levels, since the externality is not internalized, a fact that stimulates
15Nitrate vulnerable zones (NVZ) cover about 37% of EU-15 total area (EU, 2003) and are
identi￿ed as land areas which drain into waters contributing to nitrates pollution. For further
details see paragraph 1 of Article 3 (EC, 1991).
16It holds fx;fn > 0 and fxx;fnn < 0:
17The term nitrates leaching (NO3) refers to the nitrate removal from the soil by the action
of water (Owen et al, 1998). This phenomenon includes both leaching below the crop￿ s roots
due to the downward movement of water (percolation) and leaching due to the ￿ow of water
over the surface of the land (runo⁄).
18Assuming idendical farmers we drop subscript i to simplify notation.
5intervention. Each farmer i is required by the action program of the Nitrates
Directive to meet an annual per hectare aggregate nitrogen usage standard (￿ n):19
n ￿ ￿ n (4)
When the Directive is combined with an agri-environmental program of the
second pillar of CAP,20 the given performance standard becomes stricter and
farmers are provided with a subsidy sn per unit of nitrogen fertilizer used be-
neath the benchmark n￿
D that goes beyond basic standard ￿ n, in the sense that
￿ n > n￿
D. The compensation payment is:
sn(n￿
D ￿ n)
Under such a "mixed" policy regime combining the environmental require-
ments of the Directive and the ￿nancial provisions of the rural development





[pf(x;n) ￿ wx ￿ wnn + sn(n￿
D ￿ n)]
where the nitrogen application is chosen such that ￿D(n;n￿
D) is maximized, or:
￿D(nD) : nD = argmax
n ￿D(n;n￿
D) s:t: n ￿ n￿
D (5)
We assume that after the subsidy is paid pro￿ts are lower, relative to the unreg-
ulated case, thus making the compliant farmer worse o⁄ than the unregulated
farmer
￿
i:e: ￿D(nD) < ￿o(no)
￿
.
Such a pro￿t loss might be averted given the non-point-source characteristics
of agricultural pollution. The fact that individual actions (i.e. nitrogen usage)
can not be directly observed by a third party provides farmers incentives to
keep both the nitrogen application at the pro￿t maximizing level no; and the
full amount of the subsidy sn(n￿
D ￿ nD), by falsely reporting compliance with
regulation and nitrate use at the level nD; without incurring the costs that com-
pliance with the Directive entails. The payo⁄ of such noncompliant behavior, if
it remains undetected is:
￿nc
1 (no) = ￿o(no) + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD) (6)
However, farmers are aware that if detected in deviation from the action
program rules then there is an exogenous probability q to be prosecuted and
pay a ￿ne F 2 (0;Fmax] if found guilty of causing nitrate leaching pollution
by the Court.21 Moreover, given that CAP payments are subject to the cross-
19The standard is speci￿ed into 250 kg N/ha for livestock manure the ￿rst four years of
the action program and 170 kg N/ha per year after the ￿rst four years, while the limit for
manufactured nitrogen fertilizers is dependent on the crop requirements (EC, 1991).
20For further details see EU (1998; 2003).
21The ￿ne is considered to be a ￿xed amount. Nevertheless, it may be set to cover the
damage caused and the regulator￿ s cost (DEFRA, 2004).
6compliance principle,22 the detected noncompliant farmer faces a reduction or
even cancellation of provided payments by the amount:
￿sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)
where ￿ 2 (0;1] is the cross-compliance reduction rate.
Let p the auditing probability, to be speci￿ed more precisely later. If the
deviating farmer i is caught, his expected payo⁄ is given by the pro￿t maxi-
mizing pro￿ts plus the amount of the agri-environmental payment left after the
imposition of the cross-compliance penalty, minus the legislatively imposed ￿ne:
￿nc
2 (no) = ￿o(no) + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)(1 ￿ ￿p) ￿ qpF
= ￿o(no) + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD) ￿ p￿
where p￿ = p[sn￿(n￿
D ￿ nD) + qF] represents the total expected penalty for
noncompliance with the environmental requirements.
To ensure that the deviating farmer incurs a positive cost, if inspected, and
that his payo⁄ is lower than the payo⁄ in both the compliant and unregulated
case, the structure of penalties should be such that:
￿nc
1 (no) > ￿o (no) > ￿D(nD) > ￿nc
2 (no)
Despite the adequate compliance incentives, the ￿nal decision to comply or
not depends mostly on the inspection probability given the fact that individual
nitrogen usage can not be directly observed and thus compliant behavior is not
directly veri￿able. Let p be the probability that deviating activity is detected
by an environmental agency undertaking a number of random inspections:






2 < 0 (7)
where !v is a vector of parameters a⁄ecting the probability of regulation (i.e.
legislative procedures, transaction costs) and ￿ is the monitoring e⁄ort (i.e. on
the spot visits) required for the realization of an auditing scheme. By (7) the
detection probability is increasing in undertaken monitoring e⁄ort and displays
diminishing returns in ￿.
Hence, the expected pro￿ts of the deviating farmers are:
E￿nc(no) = ￿o (no) + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)(1 ￿ p(￿)￿) ￿ p(￿)qF (8)
= ￿o (no) ￿ z(sn;n￿
D;￿;q;F;￿)
where z(sn;n￿
D;￿;q;F;￿) = [p(￿)qF ￿ sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)(1 ￿ p(￿)￿)] involves the
expected penalty imposed on the detected, noncompliant farmer. The total
derivative of the expected penalty z with respect to policy parameters and
22The cross-compliance principle involving partial or full removal of aid in the event of
deviation from de￿ned standards (EC, 1999), including compliance with the provisions of ND
as foreseen by the 2003 CAP reform (EU, 2003; Aquamedia, 2006).
7monitoring e⁄ort indicates that the noncompliance penalty increases as the per-
formance standard (n￿
D); the undertaken monitoring e⁄ort (￿) and the enforce-
ment mechanism (q;F;￿) become stricter, while it decreases as the nitrogen
usage subsidy (sn) increases.23
Therefore, the su¢ cient condition for compliance is:
￿D(nD) > ￿o (no) ￿ z(g;￿)
depending on the magnitude of the undertaken monitoring e⁄ort ￿ and thus
the inspection probability p(￿) as well as the rest of the policy parameters
summarized by the vector g =(￿;sn;F;n￿
D;q).
3 Implementation of the Directive
Monitoring e⁄ort is of crucial importance both for the detection of potential
violators and the stimulation of compliance through the enforcement of foreseen
sanctions. Consider an environment agency (EA) engaging into costly and per-
fectly accurate monitoring in order to induce the majority or even the entire
population of farmers to comply with the aims of the Directive.24 The selection
of the monitoring e⁄ort level ￿ that accomplishes this goal can either be arbi-
trary, based on the alternative behavioral rules adopted by farmers, or it can be
optimal in the sense that it is obtained by minimizing a social welfare criterion
conditional to the assumed behavioral rules which involve either full or bounded
rationality.
3.1 Arbitrary Regulation Design
Assume that the level of monitoring is chosen arbitrarily based on a behavioral
context involving initially full and then bounded rationality.
3.1.1 Fully Rational Compliance Decisions
Given the policy fsn;n￿
D;￿;q;F;￿g the choice between the optimal compliance
decision (nD) and the optimal noncompliance decision (no) depends on the
structure of payo⁄s under each strategy. Fully rational farmers will decide about




nD if ￿D(nD) > E￿nc (no)
no if ￿D(nD) < E￿nc (no)
Assume that a minimum monitoring e⁄ort value ￿






















only the level of undertaken monitoring e⁄ort (￿):
8ters, making farmers indi⁄erent between the complying and deviating strategy,






: ￿D(nD) = E￿nc (no) (9)
Henceforth, if the undertaken monitoring e⁄ort exceeds the minimum value re-
quired to induce compliance, then the noncompliance decision is not pro￿t max-
imizing and farmers￿optimum response is n￿ = nD. Individual farmers perceive
that the imposition of the noncompliance sanctions is more probable and thus
prefer the pro￿t losses that compliance entails rather than the losses involved
by detected noncompliance. Given the homogeneity assumption the population
of farmers adopts a monomorphic behavior characterized by full compliance in
the sense that all the farmers adopt the optimal compliance decision. In the op-
posite case, if monitoring e⁄ort is less than ￿
min then the inspection probability
is not high enough to stimulate compliance. The optimal noncompliance deci-
sion exists and the optimum response of the population of farmers is n￿ = no,
meaning that no farmer complies with the Directive.
If the structure of the policy regime is not modi￿ed over time and the en-
vironmental agency precommits to the chosen monitoring e⁄ort then the popu-
lation takes at a given time t a "once and for all" decision, that is retained in
the future, implying either full compliance or noncompliance with the statutory
environmental requirements of the Directive. This requires that the examined
public voluntary agreement has "non-surprise" features in the sence that both
the environmental agency and the policy maker25 o⁄er assurances to regulated
agents that they will not change the terms of the agreement (i.e. g;￿), in re-
sponse to changing environmental protection needs (Langpap and Wu, 2004).
Therefore, it holds that:
Proposition 1 If monitoring e⁄ort is chosen arbitrarily, based on the assump-
tion that farmers decide about complying or not by using pro￿t maximizing be-
havior, then the entire population of farmers adopts a monomorphic behavior
which persists in the long-run. If ￿ > ￿
min then the optimum compliance deci-
sion n￿ = nD is undertaken and there is full compliance of the population, while
if ￿ < ￿
min the optimum noncompliance decision n￿ = no is undertaken and
there is noncompliance of the population:
3.1.2 Compliance Decisions under Imitating Behavioral Rules
Under bounded rationality farmers ignore the exact structure of payo⁄s and
form anticipations about the policy impacts. At a given time t the population
of farmers is divided in two groups, following di⁄erent strategies concerning
compliance with the Directive. Let x(t) be the proportion of agents adopting
the compliant strategy at time t, while xN(t) the remaining proportion deviating
from de￿ned standards and retaining the pro￿t maximizing nitrogen usage level
no, with x(t) + xN(t) = 1.






9The proportion of farmers complying with the Directive evolves in time given
the fact that farmers learn the true structure of payo⁄s via their interaction.
This involves that in every time period dt there is a positive probability kdt
that a agent i will compare its pro￿ts and consequently his strategy, with the
corresponding pro￿ts and strategy of another randomly chosen agent j.26 If i
perceives that j￿ s pro￿ts are su¢ ciently higher, then he switches his strategy.
Under imperfect information concerning the di⁄erence in the expected pro￿ts
of the two strategies, due to uncertainty about the actual auditing probability
and possible uncertainty regarding the true cost functions, the probability that
farmer i will change strategy increases the higher the pro￿ts di⁄erence is. Par-
ticularly, agent i that did not comply with the directive standard (4) at time t,
might decide to switch strategy and comply, by imitating the complying agent
if the expected pro￿ts E￿nc, are less than the pro￿ts ￿D(nD) of the comply-
ing agent. Hence, the probability that a non-complying farmer will change his




￿ [￿(nD) ￿ ￿o (no) + z (g;￿)] for ￿D(nD) > E￿nc
0 for ￿D(nD) ￿ E￿nc
The expected proportion of farmers that decide to comply at time t+dt is:
Ext+dt = xt + ￿dtxt
v X
j=1
xN￿(￿o (no) ￿ ￿D(nD))
Ext+dt = xt + ￿dtxt￿(￿D(nD) ￿ ￿ ￿(n))
where ￿ ￿(n) = x￿D(nD)+(1￿x)E￿nc(no) denotes average pro￿ts for the whole
population.
Since the population of farmers is assumed to be large, Ext+dt can be re-
placed by xt+dt. Furthermore, if we subtract from both sides the term xt, divide
by dt and take the limit as dt ! 0, an equation describing the motion of the
group of compliant agents x over time is derived:
_ x = ￿￿xt ￿
￿D(nD) ￿ ￿ ￿(n)
￿
This is the replicator dynamics equation, indicating that the frequency of the
compliance strategy increases when its pro￿ts ￿D(nD) are above the average
pro￿ts ￿ ￿(n). Thus proportional imitation rules can be modelled by replicator
dynamics. After substituting ￿ ￿(n) the replicator dynamics equation is rewritten
as:
_ x = ￿￿x(1 ￿ x)[z (g;￿) ￿ ￿￿o
D] (10)
where ￿￿ are constant factors that a⁄ect the rate of adjustment to stationarity
and are often set equal to unit without a⁄ecting the stability analysis. The
expression [z (g;￿) ￿ ￿￿o
D] = ￿(￿) represents the divergence of pro￿t losses
26For details see Schlag (1998), Gindis (2000) and Binmore (1992).
10under the deviating and compliant strategy compared to the no regulation case,
de￿ned as z (g;￿) = (￿o(no) ￿ E￿nc(no)) and ￿￿o
D = (￿o (no) ￿ ￿D(nD)).
By setting _ x = 0 in (10) we obtain the steady states of the replicator dy-
namic. It follows that in the long-run the population of farmers converges to a
monomorphic critical point characterized either by full compliance (x￿
1 = 1) or
noncompliance (x￿




= (1 ￿ 2x)￿(￿) (11)
This condition implies that full compliance is the evolutionary stable steady
state, in the sense that d_ x
dx
￿ ￿x￿
1=1 < 0, if the divergence of pro￿t losses ￿(￿) is
positive. The mechanism operates in the following way. Assume that there is a
critical value of monitoring e⁄ort (~ ￿) setting the pro￿t loss divergence equal to
zero and thus making farmers indi⁄erent between the considered strategies:
~ ￿ : ￿(~ ￿) = 0
This critical value is similar to the minimum monitoring e⁄ort value ￿
min
de￿ned under unbounded rationality, and behaves as a bifurcation parameter
since the sign of ￿ and thus the stability of the steady states, depend on the
magnitude of the undertaken monitoring e⁄ort ￿ relative to the critical value
~ ￿. Therefore the imposition of the more costly noncompliance sanctions, which
are re￿ ected in z (g;￿); becomes more likely if the undertaken monitoring e⁄ort
￿; exceeds the critical value ~ ￿. In such a case the pro￿t losses that compliance
entails are preferred to losses involved by detected noncompliance, inducing in
the long run the entire population of farmers to adopt the optimum compliance
decision n￿ = nD, in the sense that limt!1 x = 1.
Therefore, when the environmental agency precommits itself to an announced
￿xed monitoring e⁄ort ￿ it holds:
Proposition 2 If monitoring e⁄ort is chosen arbitrarily based on the assump-
tion that farmers decide about complying or not by following proportional imi-
tation rules then the population of farmers converges always to a monomorphic
steady state. If ￿ > ~ ￿ then the share of compliant farmers increases over time
resulting eventually into full compliance x￿
1 = 1 with the Directive, while if
￿ < ~ ￿ then the proportion of complying farmers diminishes over time resulting
into noncompliance x￿
2 = 0.
The total di⁄erential of ￿(g; ~ ￿) = 0 with respect to the policy parameters g
indicates that given the costs of monitoring e⁄ort the target of full compliance
can be attainable via the realization of less monitoring e⁄ort if the "mixed"
policy is characterized by a laxer performance standard (n￿
D), an increased rural
development subsidy (sn) and / or a stricter enforcement mechanism (q;F;￿),
































This implies that under the proper design of the policy parameters g the range
of monitoring e⁄ort values ￿ that induce full compliance can become wider,
allowing the environmental agency to achieve full compliance by committing to
a lower monitoring e⁄ort value and thus incurring less monitoring expenses. In
this sense there is trade-o⁄between the di⁄erent policy instruments for attaining
full compliance.
Under the replicator dynamics imitation rule the aggregate nitrate emissions
are a⁄ected by the decisions to comply with the Directive. Therefore equation
(1) is further speci￿ed as:
N = vfxnD + (1 ￿ x)no)g (12)
It is notable that if the environmental agency chooses the monitoring e⁄ort
value (or inspection probability) based on observations of compliance fraction x
and / or aggregate emissions N (or equivalently the aggregate nitrogen input us-
age n), then the inspection probability (7) with joint dependence on compliance
status x and stocks would be:







Under such a generalised inspection probability, the replicator dynamic equa-
tion (10) is rede￿ned as:
_ x = ￿￿x(1 ￿ x)[z (g;￿ (x;N)) ￿ ￿￿o
D]
where the associated stability condition is:
d_ x
dx






Under an inspection probability dependent on (x;N), the replicator dynamic
equation de￿nes two monomorphic equilibrium points, x￿
1 = 1 and x￿
2 = 0.
Nevertheless, there is a potential third equilibrium point x￿
3 2 (0;1), which
satis￿es the equilibrium condition _ x = 0 and involves partial compliance of
the regulated population. This steady state is determined by a critical pair of
compliance fraction and aggregate emissions that sets divergence of pro￿t losses
equal to zero, de￿ned as
￿






^ x; ^ N
￿￿
= 0. The existence of the
polymorphic steady state and thus the type of the prevailing equilibrium under
this generalized case, depends on the magnitude of the critical pair
￿
^ x; ^ N
￿
and





12Given the assumptions that
@￿
@x < 0 for x 2 [0;1] and
@￿
@N > 0, it holds
￿ > 0 that for any (x;N) <
￿
^ x; ^ N
￿
and that ￿ < 0 for any (x;N) >
￿
^ x; ^ N
￿
.
Hence, if the critical pair
￿
^ x; ^ N
￿

























involving that both monomorphic equilibria are unstable, while the polymorphic
equilibrium x￿
3 is stable. In the opposite case that
￿
^ x; ^ N
￿
lies outside the
interval (0;1), meaning that either
￿













^ x; ^ N
￿
, the population converges to a monomorphic steady state
involving either full or no com-pliance of the population with the Directive.
It is underlined that under an inspection probability de￿ned either as p(￿ (x))
or p(￿(N)), the long-run behavior of the population is identical to the behavior
under the under the generalized inspection probability p(￿(x;N)).27
It can be concluded thus that:
Proposition 3 If monitoring e⁄ort is chosen arbitrarily based on the imitation
dynamics rule and the state variables of the problem, the regulated population
converges either to a polymorphic or monomorphic steady state.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that under the proper design of the policy
parameters the polymorphic steady states can be driven closer to the full com-
pliance steady state.28
3.2 Optimal Regulation Design
Even though the unintended generation of nitrates emission ￿ ows o⁄ers private
bene￿ts to individual farmers, their decisions create external costs for the rest of
society (Chambers and Quiggin, 1996). Let D(N) be the social damage caused
by nitrates leaching that is assumed to be a linear function of aggregate nitrates
leaching. Given the assumed direct, one-to-one relation between individual ni-
trate leaching Ni and nitrogen input ni, social damages are given by:




27In the case of p(￿ (x)) there is a critical compliance fraction de￿ned as ^ x setting ￿ = 0,
while in the case of p(￿ (N)) there is a critical value of aggregate emissions ^ N setting ￿ =
0 respectively. In each case the type of the evolutionary stable critical point depends on
the relation between the critical value and the associated monomorphic values. Hence, the
population converges to a polymor-phic steady state either if x￿
1 > ^ x > x￿
2 or N￿
1 > ^ N > N￿
2.
28For the analysis of regulation in common pool resources under imitation dynamics, see
Xepapadeas (2005).
13where ￿ represents the constant marginal damage of aggregate emission ￿ ows
with
@D(N)
@N = a > 0.
Monitoring e⁄ort ￿ required to verify compliance is also costly to society
since it requires resources. It is usually ￿nanced by social funds raised through
taxes and furthermore involves transaction costs to the environmental agent.











Consider that the environmental agency selects the monitoring e⁄ort level in
an optimal way in order to minimize the aggregate social costs SC, de￿ned as





fm(￿) + D(n)g (13)
conditional to the expression of aggregate nitrates emission ￿ ows and the be-
havioral rule considered each time.
3.2.1 Fully Rational Compliance Decisions
If the environmental agent considers that farmers are fully rational then the
minimization problem is conditional to the compliance constraint (9). Under










The Lagrangean of the problem is:
L(￿;x;￿) = m(￿) + ￿vn + ￿
￿
E￿nc (no) ￿ ￿D(nD)
￿
where ￿ is the Langrangean multiplier denoting the impact of a marginal change
in the payo⁄ of complying agents on the value function J￿ of aggregate social
cost and is considered to represent a marginal cost (i:e: ￿ > 0).










D ￿ nD)) = 0 (14a)
@L
@￿
= E￿nc (no) ￿ ￿D(nD) = 0 (14b)
￿D(nD) = [pf(x;n) ￿ wx ￿ wnn + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)]
E￿nc(no) = ￿o (no) + sn(n￿
D ￿ nD)(1 ￿ p(￿)￿) ￿ p(￿)qF
In the absence of a budget constrained, the compliance constraint (14b) deter-
mines the optimal ￿ : ￿
￿ = ￿
min: Then the Lagrangean multiplier ￿ is deter-
mined by (14a) for ￿ = ￿
￿: Since @E￿nc(no)=@￿ < 0; if the regulator actually
applies monitoring e⁄ort ^ ￿ = ￿
￿ + " = ￿
min + "; " > 0; full compliance is at-
tained. This is a ￿ knife-edge￿result induced by the fully rational behavior of the
farmers regarding their compliance decisions. If an e⁄ective budget constraint
of the form m(￿) ￿ B is present, then monitoring e⁄ort will be chosen at a
level ￿ ￿ (B) : m
￿￿ ￿
￿
= B: If ￿ ￿ (B) is less than the minimum value ￿
min required
to induce compliance, then the compliance incentives are inadequate and the
entire population of farmers ends up adopting the noncompliance decision rule
n￿ = no. In the opposite case the compliance strategy is the prevailing strategy
and the population is characterized by full compliance with the Directive and
the optimum compliance decision n￿ = nD occurs in the long-run.
Proposition 4 If monitoring e⁄ort is selected optimally based on the assump-
tion that farmers decide about complying or not by using pro￿t maximizing
behavior, then the population always adopts a monomorphic strategy. If a
budget constraint is not e⁄ective, then full compliance is attained by choosing
^ ￿ = ￿
min+": If a budget constraint is e⁄ective, then if ￿ ￿ (B) > ￿
min the optimal
compliance decision is adopted and the population is characterized by full com-
pliance, while if ￿ ￿ (B) < ￿
min the optimal noncompliance decision is adopted
and noncompliance emerges.
3.2.2 Compliance Decisions under Imitating Behavioral Rules
Under imitating behavioral rules modelled by replicator dynamics (10), the





exp(￿￿t)fm(￿) + ￿^ n)gdt
s:t:





ni = v[xnD + (1 ￿ x)no]
15The Hamiltonian of the problem is:
H(￿;x;￿) = m(￿) + ￿v[xnD + (1 ￿ x)no] + ￿x(1 ￿ x)[z(g;￿) ￿ ￿￿o
D] (15)
where ￿ is the associated costate variable re￿ ecting the impact of a marginal





and represents the dynamic social shadow value of compliance, This value is
expected to be negative since an increase in compliance reduce social costs (i:e:
￿ < 0).






+ ￿x(1 ￿ x)
@p(￿)
@￿
￿ = 0 if ￿






_ ￿ = ￿￿ ￿
@H(￿)
@x
= ￿[￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2x)￿(￿)] ￿ ￿v[nD ￿ no] (16b)
The associated Arrow-type transversality conditions imply:
lim
t!1
exp(￿￿t)￿(t) ￿ 0 and lim
t!1
exp(￿￿t)￿(t)x(t) = 0
Assume that condition (16a) determines an interior solution (i:e: ￿
￿ > 0).
From the Implicit Function Theorem the optimal monitoring e⁄ort ￿
￿ minimiz-
ing the discounted aggregate social costs is:
(16a) : )￿= ^ ￿ (x;￿;g) = ^ ￿(x;￿;￿;sn;F;n￿
D;q) (17)
At the monomorphic steady states the value of ￿ depends on the magnitude
of the policy parameters g, while it is independent of the state and costate
variables of the problem. Hence, for x = x￿
1 = 1 or x = x￿
2 = 0; we assume that
￿ = ￿
￿
i;i = 1;2 is chosen such that both full compliance and no compliance are
conditionally attracting for the replicator dynamic equation.31 In particular,
￿
￿






positive, in the sense that the compliant strategy is preferable in terms of pro￿t
losses, so that once the population converges to the full compliance steady state
it does not diverge. On the other hand, ￿
￿
2 is selected to set the divergence
29The second-order-condition H￿￿(￿;x;￿) is positive implying that the optimal ￿￿ mini-







31Both assumptions for the values of ￿(￿￿
1) and ￿(￿￿
2) are necessary for the de￿nition of the
stability properties of the monomorphic steady states. For further details see the Appendix.
16of pro￿t losses [z (g;￿2) ￿ ￿￿o
D] = ￿(￿
￿
2) negative, so as to set pro￿t losses
under the deviating strategy preferable to the losses involved by the compliant
strategy.
By substituting (17) into (10) and (16b) the modi￿ed Hamiltonian dynamic
system (MHDS) in the state-costate space is de￿ned as:
_ x = x(1 ￿ x)
h




_ ￿ = ￿
￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ 2x)
h






where [nD ￿ no] = ￿(n)
D
o . The solution of the MHDS determines the socially-
optimal time paths (x￿ (t);￿
￿ (t)) and the socially-optimal steady state equilib-
rium point (x1;￿
1) for the compliance fraction x and its shadow value ￿, along





_ x = _ ￿ = 0
￿
; two types of possible steady states are determined
for the long-run equilibrium compliance fraction:
Monomorphic : x￿
1 = 1, x￿
2 = 0
Polymorphic : x￿
3 2 (0;1) : z(sn;n￿
D;￿;q;F; ^ ￿(x;￿;g)) = ￿￿o
D
Monomorphic critical points involve either full compliance (x￿
1) or full noncom-
pliance (x￿
2) with the Directive. They are depicted by two isoclines vertical to
the horizontal axis (￿gure 1).
[Figure 1]
The polymorphic steady state (x￿
3) is characterized by partial compliance
and is implicitly de￿ned by an isocline x(￿)j_ x=0 with the property:
￿(x)j_ x=0 : ￿(x;￿) =
h
z(sn;n￿




All the combinations (x;￿) along the ￿(x)j_ x=0 isocline satisfy ￿(x;￿) = 0.
For combination (x;￿) outside this isocline ￿ 6= 0. For combinations located
above the isocline ￿ > 0, while combinations located below are characterized
by ￿ < 0.32
The ￿(x)j_ x=0 expression is illustrated by an inverse "U" shaped isocline
with maximum at x = 1=2; (￿gure 1) since its slope is:33
d￿
dx







dx j _ x=0 > 0 for x 2 (0;1=2)
d￿
dx j _ x=0 < 0 for x 2 (1=2;1)
32It is assumed that ￿(￿￿
1) is positive, while ￿(￿￿
2) is negative, so that both full compliance
and no compliance are conditionally attracting for the replicator dynamic equation.
33This isocline does not intersect with the monomorphic isoclines of (18).
17The slope can be interpreted as re￿ ecting the relative variability of the moni-
toring e⁄ort ￿ due to changes in the levels of the state and costate variables.34
By setting (19) equal to zero and substituting the steady-state equilibria of
































2) and the fact that
￿v￿(n)
D
















2 are below the ￿(x)j_ x=0 isocline (see ￿gure 1).
The behavior of the _ ￿ = 0 isocline in the (x;￿) space is ambiguous given
that the sign of the slope:
d￿
dx
￿ ￿_ ￿=0 = ￿ ￿
￿

















can be determined only in the neighborhood of the steady-states and around
the compliance value (x = 1=2) (see ￿gure 1).35 Whether the _ ￿ = 0 curve is
continuous or not at the monomorphic values of ￿ depends on the the assump-




















^ ￿ (x;￿;g) = ￿
￿
2 (22)
simultaneously occur. However, it is more natural to assume that the hair-line
case of (22) is not satis￿ed and that the monomorphic values of ￿ are isolated
points of _ ￿ = 0.
Depending on the shape of _ ￿ = 0 and ￿(x)j_ x=0 in the (x;￿) space, the _ ￿ = 0
isocline can be depicted in several ways. If the two isoclines do not intersect,
then _ ￿ = 0 represents either a "U" shaped curve, or a curve with decreasing
and increasing parts (￿gure 2). On the other hand, if _ ￿ = 0 intersects the
￿(x;￿) = 0 once for x 2 (0;1); then it assigns a ￿xed value to ￿ for the
monomorphic steady state of (18) and de￿nes a curve with decreasing and /
or increasing parts for the remaining x values (see ￿gure 3). Finally, in the










, it is evident that d￿
dx >
0 for x 2 (0;1=2) and d￿
dx < 0 for x 2 (1=2;1).














_ ￿=0 < 0.















_ ￿=0 > 0 if x￿







_ ￿=0 < 0 if x￿
3 2 (1=2;1). At intermediate
compliance values the slope sign is uncertain.
18"knife-edge" case where the _ ￿ = 0 isocline is symmetric around x = 1=2 and





The intersection of _ ￿ = 0 and _ x = 0 isocline de￿nes the long-run equilibrium




i) depends on the shape of _ ￿ = 0 and ￿(x)j_ x=0 in the (x;￿)
space. If _ ￿ = 0 does not intersect with ￿(x)j_ x=0, then the MHDS involves
only two monomorphic steady states indicating full or non compliance (￿gure
2). On the other hand, if they intersect then the system is characterized by
the two monomorphic equilibria and one polymorphic critical point (￿gure 3),
given the fact that _ ￿ = 0 meets ￿(x)j_ x=0 only once, either at its increasing or
decreasing part.37 In this case if _ ￿ = 0 and ￿(x)j_ x=0 intersect at the increasing
part of ￿(x)j_ x=0, then the polymorphic rest point involves a small fraction of
compliant farmers (i:e: x￿
3 2 (0;1=2)), while if they intersect at its decreasing
part then it involves high proportion of compliant farmers (i:e: x￿
3 2 (1=2;1)).38
Given that monitoring e⁄ort is optimally chosen, the MHDS is characterized







2) and/or partial compliance (x￿
3;￿
￿
3) with the aims of the Directive. The
stability properties of each critical point are examined in detail in Appendix.
Stability analysis suggests that the system is characterized by multiple saddle
points potentially connected by heteroclinic orbits (see Figure 5a,b). In partic-
ular, both monomorphic rest points and the polymorphic steady state involving
a high level of compliance (i:e: x￿
3 2 (1=2;1)) satisfy the saddle point property,
implying that for any initial compliance x0; there exists an initial costate vari-
able ￿
0 such that the system converges to one of these steady states as t ! 1:
Convergence to a speci￿c monomorphic or a polymorphic state depends on the




Stability analysis also indicates that depending on the relative magnitude
of marginal social bene￿ts and costs steady states may include one stable and
36It is worth mentioning that the _ ￿ = 0 isocline cannot intersect with the monomorphic





3. Furthermore, we exclude hairline cases where the _ ￿ = 0 isocline is
tangent to the ￿(x;￿) = 0 curve.
37The slope at the polymorphic steady states is known, since the MHDS can not have
multiple polymorphic steady states.
38Nevertheless, in the special case that _ ￿ = 0 is symmetric around x = 1=2 and intersects
the ￿(x;￿) = 0 twice, the MHDS has two polymorphic critical points, with the same shadow
value for ￿ (￿gure 4).
19one unstable polymorphic steady states, with the stable steady state involving
low level of compliance (i:e: x￿
3 2 (0;1=2)). If the structure of marginal social
bene￿ts and costs is such that the trace of the Jacobian determinant Tr(J￿
3) of
























is negative, then (x￿
3;￿
￿
3) is a stable steady state. Furthermore, depending on
the sign of the associated discriminant ￿; this steady state can be a stable focus
where the approach path is characterised by oscillations (see ￿gure 6) or a stable
node without spilaring trajectories. In the special case that Tr(J￿
3) = 0 and
￿ < 0, then the polymorphic steady state is center where the system ￿ uctuates
around the rest point.
[Figure 6]
It worths mentioning that when the low compliance steady state is unstable,
then there is a possibility that a limit cycle with counterclockwise movement
exists around the given critical point (see ￿gure 7). Given that the ￿ ow of
the vector ￿eld (18) - (19) points outwards around the unstable steady state, a
limit cycle denoted by L exists if a compact positively invariant region R exists
such that the ￿ ow of the vector ￿eld is pointing inwards on its boundary.39 In
such a case all the (x;￿) combinations along the limit cycle L are stable states
and under particular initial conditions the system can be trapped in a low level
compliance area characterised by oscillating dynamics.
[Figure 7]
Hence, it can be concluded that:
Proposition 5 If monitoring e⁄ort is chosen optimally based on the assump-
tion that farmers decide about complying or not by following proportional imi-
tation rules, then depending on the initial compliance state x0; the population




or full noncompliance (x￿
2;￿
￿
2), or to a polymorphic steady state involving low or
high levels of partial compliance (x￿
3;￿
￿
3). Depending on the topological proper-
ties of the resulting evolutionary equilibrium point, the approach dynamics can
either be monotonic or oscillating.
The slope of examined isoclines in￿ uences the discrepancies between the
equilibrium compliance proportions associated with the polymorphic and monomor-
phic steady states. If the monitoring e⁄ort is more sensitive to changes in the
compliance fraction (x), or alternatively less sensitive to changes in the shadow
value of compliance (￿), then the isocline ￿(x)j_ x=0 becomes steeper and the
discrepancy between the polymorphic and monomorphic steady states increases,
39For further details see Xepapadeas (2005). For technical details see Sastry (1999).
20leading the polymorphic steady state closer to the central compliance propor-
tion, x = 1=2.40
The short-run and the steady-state comparative statics analysis indicates
that even though a reduced rural development (RD) subsidy (sn), a lax enforce-
ment mechanism (q;F;￿) and a stringent performance standard (n￿
D) induce a
reduction in the short-run socially optimal monitoring e⁄ort in the polymorphic
compliance range x 2 (0;1),41 their impact on the steady-state monitoring e⁄ort
value ￿
1
i = ^ ￿i (x1
i ;￿
1
i ;g) is ambiguous and crucially dependent on the relative
magnitude of their short-run and long-run impacts on ￿.42 Finally, it is worth
mentioning that the short-run and steady-state monitoring e⁄ort values at the
monomorphic compliance values are left una⁄ected by variations of the policy
parameters g =(￿;sn;F;n￿
D;q).
4 Implementation of the Directive under Accu-
mulation of Monitoring Capital
Apart of the occasional random spot-checks (￿), the performance of farmers can
be also assessed through a network of sampling stations, monitoring nitrogen
in soil, rootzone level, pilot ￿elds and / or small watersheds (EC, 2002). Let
I represent investment in monitoring capital in the form of ￿eld monitoring
systems, laboratory equipment and scienti￿c personnel that accumulates in time
de￿ning monitoring capital k. The net capital formation is described by:43
_ k = I ￿ ￿k (23)
where ￿ ￿ 0 is the exponential depreciation rate of monitoring capital k.
The inspection probability (7) is rede￿ned as a positive function of both
monitoring e⁄ort and accumulated monitoring capital:









40In the opposite case the ￿(x)j _ x=0 isocline is ￿atter and the discrepancies between the
rest points decrease.
41The short-run comparative statics analysis results are summarized in:
Comparative Statics
x ￿ ￿ sn n￿
D q F
￿￿ ? ￿ + + + + +
where for compliance fraction values lying within the range x 2 (0;1=2), it holds that
d￿￿
dx > 0, while for x 2 (1=2;1) then
d￿￿
dx < 0.
42The steady-state comparative statics of the monitoring e⁄ort with respect to parameters

































are the short-run and long-run powers
exercised by policy parameters g.
43It is considered that due to technological and / or budgetary restrictions the accumulated
monitoring capital does not alter the problem of non-point-source pollution into a point-source
problem, in the sense that full observability is unattainable.
21with diminishing returns both in ￿ and k.44
In this context the expected deviating payo⁄ (8) is rewritten as:
E￿nc(no) = ￿o (no) ￿ z(￿;k;g)
Investment in monitoring capital is costly to society since it involves purchase
of equipments and potential adjustment costs for the environmental agency. In
such a case the function of monitoring cost (CM) is given by a separable function
of the form:
CM = m(￿) + bI + q(I)
where b is the per unit purchase price of monitoring capital and q(I) the con-
vex adjustment costs including installation costs and personnel training (Xepa-
padeas, 1992).
It is evident that a farmer￿ s decision to comply or not depends on both
the magnitude of monitoring e⁄ort and accumulated monitoring capital. This
implies that in addition to the level of undertaken monitoring e⁄ort, the environ-
mental agent must select the level of realized investment in monitoring capital
(I) that ensures that the accumulated monitoring capital k is su¢ cient enough
to stimulate full or at least partial compliance of the regulated population with
the aims of the Nitrates Directive.
Under the assumption that there is no binding budget constraint to restrict
investment in monitoring capital and given that monitoring e⁄ort is chosen to
induce the optimum compliance decision, 45 then full compliance of the regulated
population is attained if the arbitrarily chosen investment level is set both higher
than (i) the value that makes the farmer indi⁄erent between the compliant and
deviating strategy, and (ii) the value that retains capital invariant over time ￿
I} : _ k = 0
￿
: Since capital depreciates over time (i:e: ￿ > 0). this policy implies
that the accumulated monitoring capital k does not decline over time and that
the compliant strategy (nD) is the optimal decision.
However, given (23), the accumulation of the required monitoring capital is
a time-consuming process depending on the size of undertaken investment and
the depreciation rate (￿).46 The notion of time appears in the attainment of the
desired long-run behavior. In particular, under the context of full rationality the
critical capital level behaves as a bifurcation parameter since for lower values no
farmer complies with the Directive￿ s provisions, but as soon as ^ k is reached and
exceeded there is an automatic switch of all the members of the population to
the compliant strategy. Such a direct convergence to the full compliance critical
44Note that complementarity is assumed to exist between the monitoring e⁄ort and moni-
toring capital.
45This implies that monitoring e⁄ort should be set higher than ￿min if the full rationality
behavioral rule is considered, or ~ ￿ under the assumption of bounded rationality.
46Even though there is an investment level (￿ I) that guarantees the instant accumulation of
the required capital and thus the direct convergence to the desired long-run equilibrium, such
a size of investment is unfeasible due to apparent budgetary and /or technological restrictions.
22point is not expected under the bounded rationality context where the dynamics
of the farmers￿population appear quite di⁄erentiated.
Finally, if investment in monitoring capital is selected in an optimal man-
ner, then the regulator pursues the minimum present value of the augmented
aggregate social costs by de￿ning the optimal path of both monitoring e⁄ort and
monitoring investment conditional on aggregate nitrates emission ￿ ows, the cap-
ital accumulation di⁄erential equation (23) and the behavioral rule at each point
in time. Under the full rationality behavioural rule there is no modi￿cation in
the dynamics of the farmers￿population since the regulated population retains
a monomorphic behavior regarding compliance or not with statutory require-
ments, which depends on the magnitude of the applied optimum monitoring
elements (￿





. However, under the
imitating behavioral rule the topological properties of the polymorphic steady
state involving high compliance levels (x￿
3 2 (1=2;1)) are altered, since it no
longer satis￿es the saddle point property and exhibits identical properties to
the low compliance steady state (x￿
3 2 (0;1=2)).
5 Conclusions
The non-point-source characteristics of agricultural pollution problems under-
mine the e⁄ectiveness of regulation to induce compliance with environmen-
tal considerations, rendering essential an e⁄ective monitoring and enforcement
mechanism. Both the Council Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC) and the agri-
environmental programs of the second pillar of CAP have incorporated such
mechanisms in their policy design in order to verify that regulated farmers are
complying with statutory nitrogen usage standards, and that foreseen sanctions
are enforced whenever noncompliant behavior is detected. The purpose of the
present paper was to examine whether the compliance incentives associated with
monitoring and enforcement under 91/676/EEC and the second pillar of CAP,
are adequate enough to induce the majority or even the entire population of
farmers to restrict, in the long-run, the nitrogen input usage to the level sug-
gested by a regulatory regime combining both the aims of the Directive and
the compensation payments of CAP. To do so, we considered a homogeneous
population of farmers who in their decision of whether to comply or not with
the provisions of regulation, may follow two alternative behavioral rules accord-
ing to their rationality characteristics. The selection of the monitoring and
enforcement scheme by the regulator, is characterized under two assumptions,
regarding farmers￿compliance: (i) an optimizing behavioral rule which occurs
under full rationality and, (ii) an evolutionary imitation rule which occurs under
bounded rationality.
Our results suggest that the compliance incentives of a given population of
farmers are a⁄ected by both the rule for selecting monitoring e⁄ort by the reg-
ulator and the behavioral rules under which farmers decide their compliance
strategy. If monitoring e⁄ort is chosen by the regulator arbitrarily, based ei-
ther on farmers￿optimizing behavior rule or on farmers￿proportional imitation
23rule, then the entire population of farmers adopts a monomorphic behavior,
involving either full compliance or full noncompliance. Full compliance can be
guaranteed if the environmental agency precommits to a monitoring e⁄ort value
set higher than the critical value which makes farmers indi⁄erent between com-
pliance and deviation under both behavioral rules. If monitoring e⁄ort level is
chosen optimally via the minimization of a social welfare criterion, then the same
monomorphic behavior emerges if the problem is constrained by the farmers￿
optimizing behavioral rule regarding compliance. If the social welfare criterion is
minimized conditional to the farmers￿imitation behavioral rule regarding com-
pliance, then the population may also adopt a polymorphic behavior involving
partial compliance. A further di⁄erence between the optimality and imitation
behavioral rule is the timing of the occurrence of the long-run behavior. When
farmers are fully rational in deciding about their compliance strategy, then there
is an immediate switch to full compliance or not, since the population takes a
"once and for all" decision. Under the replicator dynamics imitation rule there
is a gradual change in the composition of the population, depending on the
revealed information via the farmers￿interaction over time. Finally, the en-
forcement problem of the given regulation was reexamined under the presence
of an additional choice variable - investment in monitoring capital - indicating
identical properties with the previous analysis regarding population dynamics.
The generalized framework developed in the present paper can be further
employed for assessing populations￿compliance incentives with given environ-
mental regulations in a context of imperfect monitoring, in the sense that indi-
vidual decisions (i.e. emissions, inputs usage) may not be inferred correctly and
a farmer may be erroneously ￿ned.47 Furthermore, the long-run behavior of
farmers￿ s population can be also analyzed under di⁄erent imitation behavioral
rules such as the average pro￿t principle and e⁄ective punishment principle, in
order to detect potential modi￿cations in the qualitative characteristics of the
resulting steady-state equilibriums.48 Finally, it would be interesting to simul-
taneously combine in an optimal regulation problem both the optimizing and
the imitating behavioral rule for di⁄erent parts of the population.
47For details see Malik (1993).
48For details see Lipatov (2005).
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2) or partial compliance (x￿
3;￿
￿
3) with ND. To characterize the
equilibrium type of each steady state the linearization matrix J around each
critical point is evaluated, along with their traces Tr(J) = d_ x
dx + d_ ￿
d￿, determi-
nants Det(J) = d_ x
dx
d_ ￿
d￿ ￿ d_ x
d￿
d_ ￿
dx and discriminants ￿ = [Tr(J)]
2 ￿ 4Det(J).















































It can be seen that:































1 = 0. Given that ￿(￿
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1)) < 0 and Tr(J￿
1) = ￿ > 0
indicating that the full compliance steady state (x￿
1 = 1;￿
￿
1) satis￿es the saddle
point property.





























2 = 0. Hence, given that ￿(￿
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2))) < 0 and Tr(J￿
2) = ￿ > 0
indicating that the non compliance steady state (x￿
2 = 0;￿
￿
2) satis￿es also the
saddle point property.



























3 < 0 if x￿
3 2 (1=2;1). The Jacobian matrix around the polymorphic
































































3 2 (0;1=2) then Det(J￿
3) > 0, while sign of Tr(J￿
3) is uncertain. If




















is satis￿ed and Tr(J￿
3) < 0 then (x￿
3;￿
￿
3) is a stable steady state and depending
on the sign of the discriminant ￿ it can be a stable proper node (if ￿ = 0), a
stable improper node (if ￿ > 0), while if ￿ < 0 it is stable focus. In the special
case that Tr(J￿
3) = 0 and ￿ < 0 then the polymorphic steady state is center.49
If x￿
3 2 (1=2;1) then the polymorphic steady state is a saddle point given
that Det(J￿
3) < 0; while in the special case that x￿
3 = 1=2 then the dynamic
system experiences a nonhyperbolic point.
49For details see Xepapadeas (1997), pages 267-266.
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